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BY 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
Metaphysics concerns itself with the question, what, in prin-
ciple, is our human experience entitled to teach us about that 
which is real. Is experience a witness, competent when the right 
questions are put to her, of disclosing the nature of that ·which 
really exists~ When one interrogates a. witness to elicit informa-
tion, two questions are at stake. Is the witness sufficientl;y trust-
worthy and competent to warrant his being summoned at all, and 
secondly, what, in detail, is his specific testimony 1 Although 
one is often in no position to form any judgment as to the gen-
eral competence and reliability of the witness until after one has 
listened to his entire story, yet logical priority obviously belongs 
to the question, will the testimony which this witness is to give 
be reliable and valid. 
The relation between metaphysics and science is roughly 
analogous to that which holds between these two queries. Experi-
ence is the witness, and the question at issue is the one concern of 
scientist and philosopher alike, what really exists, and what js 
its true nature : Metaphys,ics inquires into the character of the 
witness; science listens to her story. But we are here dealing 
with an anomalous and unique situation quite different from that 
which confronts 11s when we examine witnesses in a court of law. 
For here, in the examjnation of experience, we have only one 
witness who is also the judge. Experience, in the broadest sense 
of the term, comprises the totality of what is in our possession. 
Only in the light of what the witness is himself able or willing to 
disclose, can we decide as to his probity, ingenuousness, and the 
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credibility of his tale. There is no other witness whose testimony 
may serve to check and to control our judgment. I think that this 
broad situation supplies the true basis. for the statement that 
metaphysical inquiry is to be carried on in an empirical s,pirit 
and method. How else could metaphysics pursue its inquiry, 
since experience is our only witness, the domain of all that lies 
open to our inspection. But to say that both science and meta-
physics are empirical studies, does not obliterate all distinction 
between them, least of all the logical difference between the two 
types of question to which I have-referred. I should prefer to 
say that while both science and metaphysics are empirical, since 
experience is the totality of what we possess, philosophy is prim-
arily reflective in that it undertakes to scrutinize the credibility 
of experience as a whole, and to frame what notion it can of the 
general sort of thing reality must be when judged in the light 
of the credibility-or its absence~imputed to experience. 
Before partipg with this all too crude analogy we shall do 
well to observe one implication which it would seem to carry. If 
the analogy holds, then we should have to say that reality cannot 
forthwith be identified with experience any more than the deliver-
ances of a witness can themselves be identified with the real events 
and objects which his testimony discloses when it is valid. We 
possess the witness; he is in our presence, his, story we listen to; 
but we try to extort from him something which we do not in the 
same sense possess, the truth about that for which we need a 
witness precisely because it is not within our immediate grasp. 
But it may well be that there is no term more hopelessly 
ambiguous and misleading, more redolent of warring· philo-
sophical traditions, than this term 'experience.' The use of the 
term 'experience' without anything further to qualify and to 
specify it, may well appear as a philosophical scandal. The term 
'experience' may indeed be used in a sense sufficiently wide to 
include everything which we possess, all that in any way comes 
within the range of what we sense, feel, know, believe in, think of, 
or imagine. Alexander has this inclusive use of the term in mind 
when he speaks of "taking it as self-evident that whatever we 
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know is a,pprehended in some form of experience.' '1 But, if 
this be the denotation of the term, then nothing namable or think-
able remains outside of experience to be set over against it or 
contrasted with it. In so inclusive a use of the term it would be 
idle to say or to imply what I said a moment ago, that we are 
interested in using experience which is what we have, in order 
to discover something about reality which we do not possess. For, 
in gaining some supposed information about reality, ,ve would 
be bringing reality within the area of that ·which we believe in 
or think about; it would become an object of our experience 
which may thereby have become enlarged or corrected, but not 
set over against any reality which does not belong to that which 
we do experience. 
But the term 'experience' is very commonly used in a nar-
rower sense. Two of these more restricted meanings of the term 
may here be distinguished. First, experience may be used to 
designate the proces,ses or a.ctivities of experiencing, with the 
emphasis on the last syllable. Experiencing is the generic name 
for such processes as seeing, hearing, liking\ believing, judging, 
inferring, planning, being interested in, mani_pulating, and 
behaving, in so far as these a.re operations in which our minds, or 
ourselves as conscious, engage. These processes of experiencing 
all terminate in something which is their object, either a direct 
object, as the cloud which we watch float by, or a cognate object 
· or accusative, as in dreaming. a dream or running a race. Sup-
pose we agree that experience, in the former unrestricted sense, 
comprises both processes and their objects, the process of seeing 
and the cloud which is seen. We may still feel impelled to say 
that the process of seeing is more truly and literally a moment 
or pulse within experience than is the thing seen. I possess or 
even am, at the moment, the conscious process, the seeing, and I 
am not the cloud. The cloud is the object of my experience as 
an experiencing·, but is·in no wise comprised within it. This, the-
first restricted sense of the term, identifies experience with some 
conscious process of experiencing. 
1 Space, Ti111e and Deity, I, p. 4. 
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But there is another meaning o,f the term which still restricts 
it to something narrovver tha.n the totality of ·what we may in 
any sense be said to experience, without confining it simply to 
processes of experiencing. Experience may refer to and include 
something which is thought to be literally and directly present 
within the total process of experiencing· but present as a quality or 
content, sensed or felt, and hence distinct from any process of 
sensing or of feeling. But such a sensed or felt quality is, so 
indissolubly fused with the process of sensing or feeling that if 
one asserts that the process is mental, one will also affirm that the 
quality in which the process terminates is mental. Here is then 
a sense datum, a sensiim, an idea or feeling, as quality not as 
process, some content of consciousness. A cognate objective, a 
content which is peculiarly intimate to the process~the dream 
which I dream, the plan which I plan-is not itself any process, 
yet is so closely bound up with the process as to be existentially 
inseparable from it. The experienced, in the presen~ mea.ning of 
the term, is literally engulfed within the mind, and is no external 
or transcendent object. 
The existence of both conscious processes and of mental con-
tents or data has been denied, either in a complete and wholesale 
manner, or with reference to certain alleged classes of such pro-
cesses and such contents. In Alexander's type of realism, for 
instance, our processes of consciousness which we ''enjoy'' term-
inate directly in those non-mental and independently real entities 
with which they a.re compresent, and which we may '' contem-
plate.'' Things perceived, imagined and in any way appre-
hended are not present within our processes of perceiving, 
imagining, and apprehending, nor are they cognate objectives. 
They are externally present to or with these processes, as the 
chair is present to the floor upon which it rests. In other types 
of realism, so-called neo-realism, for instance, all supposed pro-
cesses are analyza.ble into groupings of neutral contents ·whicl1 
may be either mental or non-mental, depending upon their con-
text and relations. But all such theories are metaphysical inter-
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pretations of the real nature and status of what, within our 
experience, appear to be processes, contents, and objects. And 
the problems discussed by these theories arise precisely because 
experience does present us with generically distinguishable 
aspects and with different possible ranges of extent to be 
designated by the term 'experience.' 
Experience then may be a concept used to denote three such 
fields. In a completely unrestricted sense it stands for the 
. totality of all that which is any way experienced. Again, in one 
restricted sense, it stq,nds. either for mental contents and qualities 
alone, or such data along with conscious processes which have 
these contents for their cognate objects. Or thirdly, the term 
may be still more narrowly limited simply to these processes 
themselves. It is this wide range in the possible meanings of 
the term 'experience' which gives. point to the question put by 
Royce, "when is experience not experience" ?2 When, in other 
words, are we tempted to say that we experience things whereas 
in strict and literal truth we do not, in our actual exp~rience, 
possess them? The inquiry into what indeed it is that we do 
literally experience, and what the relation is between processes 
of experiencing·, the immediate data or contents of experience, 
and any more remote and distant objects of experience, should 
such be supposed to exist, has supplied some of the major prob-
lems of recent philosophical discussion and controversy. I should 
myself be willing to suppose that certain positive results have 
emerged from these inquiries. I am constrained to believe that 
the substantive thing or process which alone is fairly entitled to 
be called experience is something more limited in its scope and 
narrower in its range, than is reality. Nor does this belief compel 
me to deny that experience, thus. limited as it is, may be a dis-
closure and a revelation of the real. What the witness tells us, 
whether our attitude be that of credulity or skepticism, is not 
existentially identical with those real events and structures about 
which the witness purports to speak. The shores of experience-
to shift the metaphor-are washed by waves which roll in from 
2 Royce, Lectiires on Modern Idealism, p. 18. 
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the ocean of reality, stretching out beyond any horizon discernec 
by us. Experience dips into reality, touches it in spots and seg-
ments, makes intermittent soundings, throws some dim and vacil-
lating light upon the realm of existence. Reality is, if you will, 
thus experienced, but reality does not coincide with experience. 
The island is bathed by the ocean waves, and on that very account 
the ocean can neither be identical with nor a part of the island. 
If to make some such pronouncement as this forthwith entitles 
me to be enrolled among the realists, I must humbly beg admit-
tance to their hardy band. But this broad platform says, so far, 
nothing more than that experience is something which we do 
possess and of whose 1ia.ture we may expect to ha.ve some adequate 
knowledge, while reality is that which we may wish and even 
hope to know, but of whose knowledge we may not be so directly 
confident. And if we do believe ourselves eventually to come 
into possession of reality or of a knowledge of reality, such pos-
session will have a cle jiire quality and will be thus logically dis-
tinct from that first de facto possession of ours which is experi-
ence, in some one of the meanings above enumerated. 
But experience is an ambiguous possession not only in those 
respects already indicated. The language of common sense as 
well as that of science and philosophy provides a vocabulary 
which suggests that in addition to our possessing data of experi-
ence, whatever their nature and range, whether processes, con-
tents, or objects, there exists along with or within experience a 
region which is in some significant way distinct and specific. 
The terms thought, idea, reflection, understanding, reason, seem 
to mark off some :fielcl which has characteristics other than those 
possessed by mere experience, by feeling, sensation, perception. 
Again one notes the mischievous ambiguity of the word experi-
ence. If it is -c.sed to designate all that we have or do, it cannot 
be contrasted with anything else that we possess or perform, and 
we are not entitled to say that, in addition to experiencing things, 
we reflect upon them, think and reason about them. Our human 
way of experiencing things may be thus to reflect upon and to 
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interpret.them, but they will have to be in some way experienced 
before they become subjected to the processes of thought and 
reflection. Unquestionably, some analysis of the nature of the 
processes designated by the terms reason and reflection, and of 
the relation of these processes either to the wider area of experi-
ence in general, or to the data of experience in some more 
restricted sense, must be attempted before we may profitably 
inquire into the central theme of metaphysics, the relation 
between experience and reality. It is this analysis, this question 
of the relation between reason and experience, which will chiefly 
concern us here. Only at the end of what I fear will be a long 
and tedious journey shall I touch, and then but lightly, upon the 
question as to how experience stands in relation to reality. I 
should wish, however, that our inquiry ancl analysis might serve 
as a useful prolegomena to that further undertaking. That it is 
necessar_y' to make an ana.lysis of the meaning of experience, to 
ask what it is and what makes it possible, before we raise the 
issue as to the meta.physical validity of any concept whatever, is 
sufficiently close to the critical enterprise of Kant to furnish us 
with a, fitting theme on this occasion. 3 
What area of experience, then, what interests, motives, and 
processes are covered by the concept of reason, and what is the 
relation between reason and experience~ I shall here distinguish 
three meanings of the concept of reason, three different interpre-
tations of the significance and function of that for which the 
term reason stands, and I shall observe the relation of reason, in 
these three different formulations, to experience at large. These 
diverse interpretations of reason are not merely three possible 
dictionary meanings which are attached to the word. Rather do 
they represent three persistent and deep-seated motives of philo-
sophical analysis and reflection. I shall wish not merely to 
describe them as three broad types of theory, but to give some 
indication, however scanty, of what I conceive to be their relative 
adequacy and profundity. 
3 This paper was read on April 22, 1924, the bicentenary of the birth 
of Kant. 
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I offer at once a preliminary and approximate cha.racterization 
of these three interpretations. First, reason may be used as a 
term to designate the mind's interest in the maximum of attain-
able certainty, certainty which is indubitable and which can pro-
vide an unshakable foundation for the structure of knowledge 
and, if possible, for man's practical undertakings as well. Reason, 
so defined, is contrasted with tha,t portion of experience which is 
not rational, in so far as this latter area, whether theoretical or 
pJ:iactical, is subject to doubt, uncertainty, and confusion. The 
rational will be that which, whatever its other characteristics, is 
purged of uncertainty and fluctuation, and which stands forth 
clearly as a solid and sure possession, a 71"oV ,nw, capable of meet-
ing every challenge and every doubt. In the second pla.ce, reason 
may be said to denote the mind's interest in the maximum of 
attainable meaning, where meaning implies mutual implications, 
inclusiveness, continuity, and coherence. The rational is now the 
systematic, the well-organized, some synthe•sis of details held 
together by an unbroken thread. The area of rationality, in this 
second meaning of the concept, is contrasted with the non-rational 
parts of experience in so far as these latter are partial, momen-
tary, and fragmentary, an aggregate of items deta.ched, having 
neither totality, continuity nor coherence. 
These two principles or motives to each of which has been 
given the epithet 'rational,' the interest in certainty and in con-
tinuity of structure, have appeared under various guises in the 
history of philosophy. These two motives are represented in the 
philosophy of Leibniz, for instance, by the principles of identity 
and of sufficient reason. For, as I shall presently note, one type 
of certainty is supplied by the presence of an identical content, 
so that the search for identities, for self-identical entities, is the 
mark of reason and the path which leads to certainty. The prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, on the other hand, connotes an interest 
in wide ranging continuous structures, held together by the bond 
of causality, or by some thread which links part to part within 
something total and inclusive . .Again, the two criteria of necessity 
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and universaltty, as the two proper characteristics of all rational 
judgments, would seem to point in these same two directions. 
Necessity spells certainty and the rigid exclusion of any alterna-
tive possibility; universality connotes that which holds and is 
valid for some sweeping and inclusive area. I am not however 
here inclined to lay weight upon any specific historical forms in 
which the two principles of certainty and of continuity may have 
appeared. I suggest these merely as possible and, I think, 
legitimate illustrations. 
The third interpretation of the nature of reason and the 
rational, I find somewhat more difficult to designate concisely. It 
is the outcome of observing' that the human mind or spirit has a 
nature which is, in some sense, its own; it has, that is, interests, 
purposes, and intentions, and when the mind either constructs or 
finds anything ·which embodies or expresses these, its own ways 
of doing or thinking, it recognizes in them a meaning of a dis-
tinctive sort. The rational character which belongs to objectively 
continuous and coherent structures, to mathematical systems, for 
instance, and which exemplifies our seconcl interpretation of the 
meaning of tha.t which is rational, seems to me to be different, 
at least prima facie, from the rational significance which any situ-
ation or object possesses because it expresses or fulfils some pur-
pose and intention. Adapting the distinction which Royce has 
made familiar, though not using it here in just his sense, we may 
say that the former of these two meanings, that which objectively 
continuous structures possess, is an '' external meaning,'' while 
the meaning, which attaches to whatever I recognize as in some 
manner continuous with my own life, my own nature and needs, 
possesses an "internal" meaning. This, then, is our third inter-
pretation of the concept of reason. The rational is now that 
which expresses the mind's purposes and intentions, and stands 
in contrast to the non-rational portions of experience in so far as 
· this latter region presents us with something alien, with sheer 
brute data, with that which we cannot understand precisely 
because it is in no wise continuous with our own purposes and 
ways of behavior. 
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Here are three diverse interpretations of the province and 
function of reason. Each of them has its own version of the rela-
tion between reason and experience. Each carries certain impli-
cations as to the possibility and the results of metaphysical 
inquiry. But each one of these three interpretations of reason 
and the rational is sufficiently broad and flexible to admit of a 
considerable measure of diversity. This is emphatically true of 
our first interpretation of the meaning of reason, its definition in 
terms of the desire to attain the maximum of certainty. For, the 
mind's interest in certainty, in possessing among all of its experi-
ences that which may rightfully s,erve as an indubitable premise 
and foundation for any of the mind's ventures-theoretical or 
practical-has found expression in two divergent directions. 
That which is most certain is, on the one hand, that which is 
most immediate, that which lies nearest to us. Uncertainty 
increases with distance and remoteness. I may hit a bull's eye 
two feet away easier and oftener than one twenty feet away. 
A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. That which I 
literally and immediately touch and see, I know .and am certain 
of; the absent and hidden which I must infer or posit is alwa.ys 
more dubious. The possibility of error increases, ·with the num-
ber and complexity ·of steps intervening between data and con-
clusion, between what I hold and have and that which I hope 
eventually to reach. The only inelucta,ble certainty belongs to 
that which I most immediately possess, to that which most directly 
confronts me, and only at the very moment when I so have it 
before me. At another moment, even the next-if there be one-
I may have no such immediate assurance of i.t, for it belonged 
wholly to the moment which has now vanished. Certainty spells 
complete and utter immediacy. 
But, on the other hand, certa.inty ha,s commonly been thought 
to lodge in and to characterize only such ideas or contents as 
possess complete clarity and simplicity. That alone is certain 
which, being just itself, some one quality, essence, or content, 
repels everything other than its own simple nature; or rather, 
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which, in its own self-identity and isolation, is not called upon 
to repel anything for, from its, own standpoint, there is nothing 
other. A transparently clear and distinct idea would be such 
an essence, in which all confusion, all suggestions. of internal and 
external otherness, ate wholly absent. To admit any such com-
plexity and confusion, other than what the self-identical nature 
of the one content itself demands, would be really to contradict 
that nature. It would be to set up conflicting claims which would 
challenge the simple and clear integrity of the .one content or 
. essence itself. Clarity· and certainty thus imply and require the 
complete a.bsence of self-contradiction; confusion and complexity 
are but the beginning· of such contradiction. For confusion and 
obscurity are not compatible with that self-identity which simple, 
clear, and certain i_deas require. Certainty thus, connotes clarity, 
clarity means simplicity and identity, the absence of confusion 
and of all internal contradiction. Such clear and '' simple 
natures,'' as Descartes calls them, are the seeds of certainty in 
all of our knowledge. 
Here are, then, two divergent types, of that certainty, whose 
quest is the mark of reason and whose presence is the criterion of 
rationality. Certainty means either immediacy or such clarity 
and simplicity as exclude all confusion and otherness. If, to 
define the' area of rationality requires the exclusion of whatever 
is subject to doubt and uncertainty, then one will banish from 
that area either all that is. not immediate, or else everything 
which is_ confused and complex, all that falls outside the botmd-
aries of clearly definable, constant, and identical essences. Des-
cartes appears to have thought that immediacy and simple clarity 
were not only compatible with one another but that, in one 
important instance at least, each implied the other. The cer-
tainty of self-consciousness, vouched for by its immediacy-for 
what lies nearer to me than my own process of thinking, of being 
conscious-provides a model and pattern of that which any clear 
and distinct idea should be if it is to be a source of certain knowl-
edge. Were self-consciousness. not something so utterly imme-
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diate it would not be so simple, so lacking in complexity and 
mediation. Such absence of any germ of internal discrepancy 
and contradiction constitutes, for Descartes, precisely the mark 
of simplicity and of clarity, and hence of certainty. I think that 
there is some good ground for supposing Descartes to be right in 
thus linking immediacy and such cla.rity as excludes all internal 
confusion and obscurity. The present immediate moment, how-
ever specious, it be, has a relative simplicity of content which 
wider areas of experience, such as remembered tracts of past 
time or anticipated stretches of future time, do not possess. That 
which lies nearest to me does commonly lack the articulation and 
complexity of detail which things at a distance, seen in a wider 
perspective, a.ppear to possess. Immediately present da.ta, what-
ever they may be, do constitute for ea.ch of us the center of the 
total area of experience. A.s one goes outward from this center 
both sheer immediacy and relative simplicity of content are 
repla.ced by mediation, diversity, and complexity of content. 
But whether or not these two renderings of. certainty, as 
immediacy and as that self-identity which "simple natures" 
possess, are mutually compatible, they share in common one 
important chara.cteristic with respect to the relation between the 
area of certainty and experience at large. The domain of that 
which is certain, understood in either way, is much narrower than 
the total field of our experience, when the term experience is used 
in its unrestricted and most inclusive sense. Much or even most 
of what we experience, in this meaning of the term, falls outside 
of the area of certainty either because it is remote and not imme-
diate, or because it is diverse, confused, and obscure. Hence, if 
the rational is the certain, then most of our experience is irra-
tional, and the field of certainty and ra.tionality is a precarious 
and tiny island surrounded on all sides. by the sea of uncertainty 
and irrationality. I desire to lay some stress upon the relation 
between reason and experience implied by this first interpreta-
tion of the nature of reason, to suggest some illustrations of it, 
not only because of its importance in the history of thought, but 
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because, as we shall note, this relation become,s reversed ·when we 
turn to the second interpretation of the province and func.tion of 
reason. 
If reason be supposed to search out or to elabora.te clear and 
simple ideas, if the whole life of reason be lived only amongst 
such fixed and constant meanings as permit of no change and 
diversity, if the principle of identity be the core of logic, then 
those philosophers would seem to be right who report the exist-
ence of a fundamental antinomy between. logic and experience. 
Or, since after all our logic obviously belongs to our experience, 
we had better describe this relation between reason and experi-
ence by saying that reason draws from experience only a thin 
and abstract web of concept&--static, discrete, and frozen-
infinitely poorer in content and meaning than experience itself. 
And, it need sca.rcely be mentioned, this, has, formed the theme of 
numerous types of irrationalism and anti-intellectualism, of the 
appeal from logic to intuition and experience. There is a. steady 
drift in this direction throughout the development of James' 
thinking from his early essays and his Psychology to -the frank 
and explicit statements, of A Pliira:listi;c Universe, in which he 
definitely discards the '' intellectualistic logic,'' the logic of 
identity, and comes with a final sigh of relief to the ultimate 
discovery that life and reality are irrational. '' Reality, life, 
experience, concreteness, immediacy, us·e what word you will, 
exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.' '4 It can form 
no part of my plan to go over again the familiar ground of this 
critique of logic, based upon the alleged fact that logic can con-
cern itself solely with identities,, whereas experience is rich in 
diversity and is in constant flux, never the same from individual 
to individual, nor from moment to moment. That ideas contain 
less than experienced perceptions, that scientific laws resume 
only an abstract and partial aspect of concrete facts and events, 
tha.t no conce.pt or definition is adequate to the full nature and 
reality of an experienced individual, these well-worn theses are 
4 W . .James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 212. 
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repeatedly set forth as the outcome both of empiricism and of the 
'' idealistic reaction against science.'' This is true of traditional 
empiricism, because in the development of impressions into ideas 
very much is shuffled off and faded, so that what remains in the 
idea, the concept, is far poorer in content than is its original. 
And from the same interpretation of the nature of thought and 
ideas arises that disbelief in the competency of the sciences to 
discover what is real because science is conceptual and symbolic, 
its '' symbols repres.enting the likenesses among individuals and 
the likenesses among these likenesses, ~o tending indeed towards 
. an abstract and spurious unity, but farther and farther away 
from the living· whole.' '5 
Meyerson, first in his IclemtMe et Realite, and ten years later 
in De l'explicat~on dams les sciMices, has offered a penetrating 
analysis of the actual role which the search for identities plays in. 
scientific explanation. To explain a phenomenon, to render it 
intelligible to our miderstanding, is to discover an identity of 
content between it, its antecedents, and its surroundings. For 
instance, rationally to comprehend any diversity in space is to 
replace that apparent diversity by a real identity and homo-
geneity so that a genuinely rational matter would be ultimately 
nothing but space itself, which is what Descartes supposed.G I 
have no intention, even were I able, to inquire into the validity 
or adequacy of views of this type, with respect to the logical 
requirements of scientific explanation. I mention them as illus-
trations of what is, I think, the outcome both historical and 
logical, of the Cartesian interpretation of reason as the intuition 
of clear and distinct ideas, of '' simple natures .. ' ' This interpre-
tation carries with it the implication that the area of rationality 
is far narrower and more restricted than is the total domain of 
our experience. And it is in this respect that this interpretation 
of certainty joins hands with the other definition of certainty in 
terms of immediacy. 
0 G. vVarcl, N atiiralism and Agnosticism, II, Jl· 91. The Domain of 
Natiiral Science, by E. W. Hobson, has but Tecently offerncl a similaT inteT-
pretation ancl criticism of the exact sciences. 
6 Cf. Meyernon, De l'explication dans les sciences, I, Jl· 177. 
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How much of any specific experience is literally and utterly 
immediate, what core of experience remains. when all construc-
tion, all mediation and inference, all probability and belief, when 
anything even slightly trans.cendent to the immediately given, is 
stripped away? What is the d.afom d.a,tissimivrn of experience? 
This question, always, of central importance, becomes especially 
pressing if rationality and certainty are defined as immediacy. 
To ans,ver this ques,tion in detail and with precision offers, for 
me at any rate, very great difficulties:, and I am far from trying 
or wishing to attempt an ans:wer here. But I may righ.tfully be 
called upon to choos.e between two alternative types of answer, 
and so far as that broad choice is: concerned, I myself can have 
no hesi.tation. Either, we must say that everything which I in 
any way experience, all that I perceive, remember, image, hope 
for, or believe in, is an entity directly presented or contemplated, 
hence immediately before me, at the time when I do so experi-
ence it. This implies a direct, presen.tative realism, far from 
nai:ve, I should s.uppose, for I doubt whether any philosophical 
theory is or should be nai:ve. Or, we shall say that literally pre-
sented and immediate data. are something· less or other than 
objects perceived, remembered, and believed in, and that some 
process of inference or of construction supervenes upon the imme-
diate data to yield the world which we experience and within 
which we live and act. I say that as between these two broad 
alternatives, my decision is, not difficult. The immediate is, I 
should hold, always less than the experienced, save at a possible 
ideal lower limit of experience. Some of the grounds for this 
choice I shall presently mention. For the moment I would urge 
merely that if reason is interpreted as, the interest in and the 
possession of whatever is certain, that if, further, the certain is 
defined as the immediate, then rationalism issues, in skepticism 
because the immediate is always far narrower and more restricted 
than the objects which we are said to know, in whose existence 
we believe, and with which our practical dealings hold commerce. 
It is, I think, one large merit of Santayana's recent volume, 
Scept~cism am,d. Anvma:Z JJ'a,ith, to have made plain so much as this. 
158 University of California Piiblica.tions. [PHILOSOPHY 
"Nothing· given exists," and it is with what exists, with what is 
really there in the offing·, ready to aid us or to overwhelm us, that 
both our pra,ctical and our cognitive interests are concerned. 
Only essences a.re immediately given, and essences are not exist-
ences ; they are no substances, no portions of matter and the stuff 
of nature. They are indeed the possible contents, or objects of 
our intuition when we, ceasing to know or to act, are willing 
merely to gaze upon the immediately given; they are, too, the 
terms of our human discourse, not the real beings of practical 
pursuit and avoidance, nor the things we desire to know and to 
fathom. An earlier lecture in this series has afforded a brilliant 
analysis of Santayana's central thesis, and that shall be my 
excuse for carrying my own exposition and illustration no farther. 
I have wished primarily to observe the deep analogy between 
the type of theory and analysis represented by Santayana, and 
that represented by James and Ward, with respect to the relation 
between the domain and extent of what is rational, and the wider 
range of our total experience. Both kinds of theory, profoundly 
different as they are in other respects, agree in interpreting the 
rational as the logically certain, the indubitable. That which is 
rationally certain is, for both types of theory, vastly less than 
that which is experienced. For Santayana it is less, because the 
certain is defined as the immediate, and things known, constitut-
ing the ·world of belief and of our practical life, are simply not 
anything immediate. In James ancl Ward, the rational is the 
domain of fixed conceptual entities, clear and distinct ideas, 
identical contents, while experience with its diversity and its 
change, its life and its flux, vastly exceeds the capacity of reason 
thus defined to disclose or to represent, save in the most schematic, 
symbolic, and even distorting fashion. 
But I must turn to our se_cond interpretation of the meaning 
and function of reason. I have said that it consists in defining 
reason in terms of our interest in coherence, in continuity, in the 
discovery of that which links the immediate to that which is 
wider, more objective, and more remote. Now the result of that 
analysis which formed the basis of the first interpretation of 
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reason was to isolate a, smaller area of certainty, of rationality, 
within the wider circle of experience. That field of immediate 
certainty will be small indeed, immeasurably narrower than the 
vvorld which we experience, within which we act and which we 
apprehend. But as this region of certainty and rationality con-
tracts and shrivels to pure immediacy or to the insight that A is 
.A, the meaning which the immediate data or the simple, self-
identical natures possess also diminishes. The concept of mean-
ing, as I here employ it, is nothing recondite or difficuU. Foll 
any entity to have a meaning, as I now use this term, signifies 
simply that the entity points to something other than or beyond 
itself. Meaning implies relations, some context and setting, some 
orderly structure and configuration which reaches out beyond 
the datum or entity which possesses meaning. Do we experience 
meanings in this sense of the term? I must answer both yes and 
no, depending on the denotation of the term experience. In its 
completely unrestricted sense, of course we experience meanings 
as well as data. · Otherwise we should never speak of them, think 
of them, or raise questions about them. But if by exper1ence is 
meant only what we immediately and literally experience, I must 
give more of a negative reply to the question, for reasons which 
I have still to mention. But I now call attention to the fact that 
that element or function which builds out the smaller circle of 
immediate experience into the wider field of experience at 
large has frequently-and I think leg·itimately-been identified 
with reason, thought, ideas, judgment, inference. So pervasive 
throughout all the levels of our experience are meanings, that 
the difficulty of isolating an absolutely immediate datum of exper-
ience, purged of all mediation, seems to me very great, if not 
overwhelming. .A statement of certain of the difficulties attend-
ant upon this attempt will supply the gTolmds for my assertion 
that experience normally comprises much more than anything 
immediate, and may also serve to justify the use of the concept 
'reason' to indicate those processes whereby the mind transcends 
the immediately given. 
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The first obs.ervation is that of the weH-worn fact that very 
much of what seems to be given in experience involves. an infer-
ence, and is not literally given just as we do experience it. I 
hear a noise and I perceive it to• be the noon chimes of the cam-
panile. I see a colored sha.pe, and I say that it is Mt. Tamalpais. 
My perce1Jtions are shot through with inferences and interpreta-
tions. They are drenched with meanings which are not immediate 
in the same sense as are the literal masses of immediate experi-
ence, call them sense data., essences,, or what you will. I am not 
denying that all which I perceive may be every whit as objective 
as are the qualities immediately sensed. I am not implying that 
we, in perceiving, create or project into the void some halo of 
meaning around a nucleus of objective data. I do hear the cam-
panile chimes; what I see is the real Mt. Tamalpais; I remember 
a real past. But in doing all this, I infer and interpret as well 
as merely recognize an immediately given. With the pronounce-
ment of Bradley I must concur, that '' if we cannot demonstrate 
that every possible piece of fact is modified by apperception, the 
outstanding· residue may at least perhaps, be called insignifi-
cant.'" .A surprising paradox it may be, that our processes of 
apperception, inference, and construction shoulcl yield, instead 
of an artificial and unreal fabrication, a more a.dequate disclosure 
of the real than any immediately given data, a pa.radox to which 
I shall revert at the end. 
There is a second difficulty in the attempt to isolate an island 
of immediate certainty where everything is given, and where 
there is no hint of anything not given. It lies in the character of 
incompleteness, which every immediate datum seems to me to 
possess. Such incompleteness is something lying wholly within 
the present datum, to be sure, but it is also something which 
prevents its absolute isolation from any outlying region. It 
appears to me indubitable that my present perceptual field, per-
ceived objects and events in space-time, is. experienced as stand-
ing in some relation to a wider context which is not in the same 
, F'. H. Brndley, Essays on Triith and Reality, p. 10-9. 
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immediate way given. The perceptual field is perceived as having 
an edge, not sharp and not constant. It shifts spatially as I 
turn my head, as I watch moving objecfa, and as I perceive the 
flow of events. Some wider context of space and time qualifies 
my present perceptual field. What I perceive is not only sufEused 
with inference and meaning within, but it is perceived as enclosed 
by wider spaces and times, itself partial and fragmentary, a 
present moving between past and future, a spatial field bordered 
by spaces which I do not perceive. This characteristic of my 
experience is not properly to be labeled an inference. It is appre-
hended along with the perceived field as the converse, so to speak, 
of the latter's fragmentariness. It is not a subsequent inference, 
and is not dependent upon prior perceptions. of other spaces and 
of. earlier times. Whether it be better to say that spa,ce and 
time in vastly wider stretches than we ever directly perceive are 
intuited or are thought, in either case their apprehension enters 
into and qualifies what I here and now perceive. 
Consider, in the third place, the status of Santayana '.s essences. 
It seems to me that when I try to gaze upon some essence which 
has just now' swum into my ken,' when I greet it and contemplate 
it as an essence,· know it for what it is as just this essence and 
no existing natural object, I also do something more. I some-
how locate it in a realm of essence, a, realm impalpable, but no 
less one of which this particular essence is, but a single denizen. 
That is, my intuition of an essence is related to the wider context 
of the realm of essences much as my present perceptual field is 
apprehended as belonging' to a, wider spatial context. In saying 
this, I think that I am but repeating the argument of Bradley 
against the existence of '' floating ideas.'' The one essence pres-
ent to my intuition is indeed a floating specter, detached from 
the solid world of nature's objects; but it is not floating in respect 
to just this realm of essence. It is recognizable as an essence 
because it inhabits this world. In its intuition there is implied 
a reference to that realm. "Because there are many worlds, the 
idea which floats suspended above one of them is attached to 
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another. There are in short floating ideas, but not ideas which 
float absolutely. EverYidea on the contrary is an adjective which 
qualifies a real world, and it is loose only when you take it in 
relation to another sphere of reality.' '8 These three observations 
then, that experience is replete with inference, that experienced 
(perceived) fields are apprehended as incomplete, and that the 
intuition of any one datum posits a realm wider than the single 
essence itself, suggest some of the difficulties which attend any 
attempt completely to isolate and to sever a pure area, of imme-
diacy from anything beyond. I must omit any discussion of 
perplexities which attend the alternative interpretation of cer-
tainty in terms of clear and simple natures, and of the ana.Jogous 
difficulties of isolating such pure threads of identity amidst the 
flux and confusion of experience. 
It is such considerations as, these which I have just mentioned 
that compel my recognition of a flmction which builds out the 
range of our knowledge beyond anything we possess in immediate 
experience, and this function is ascribed to ideas i:p. the interpre-
tation of reason now before us. But once more the ambiguity of 
the term experience deserves mention. 1,Vhen experience is. used 
to designate the totality of all that we possess and do, it is idle 
to sa.y that ideas and inference, perception and belief, memory 
and anticipation expand the area of experience. But a mere 
cataloging of these varied and diverse objects of our experience, 
which is, I think, all that certain types of realism amount to, 
serves only to obliterate and to conceal the real problem. When 
experience is used as a name for that which is so intimate, so 
much a part of us, something so immediate that merely having 
experience is seen to be widely different from having knowledge, 
there arises the plausible possibility of defining reason, thought, 
as that which enables our minds to know and to dwell amidst 
structures which encompass vastly more than one fragmentary 
and partial experience. This is, in any case, a second interpreta-
tion of the meaning and function of reason. Reason now signifies 
s Bradley, ibid., p-. 32. 
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universality, objectivity, coherence, continuity, mutual implica-
tions, system. It connotes distance and remoteness, the possibility 
of transcending· immediacy. Each one of these concepts will 
suggest some familiar type of philosophical theory, the barest out-
line of which would go beyond anything which I should here 
attempt. What I wish to observe is that if the capacity and 
function of thought and ideas are so interpreted, then, instead 
of reason being a little island surrounded by experience, it is 
now experience which is small, partial, and fragmentary in rela-
tion to those outlying, distant, and objective structures which 
reason and ideas apprehend. Experience becomes the island, 
and the realm germane to reason the surrounding ocean. 
I shall but mention two considerations of wide import which 
throw light upon this interpretation. Reason is a term fairly 
applicable to the possession and use of ideas. Now one general 
function of an idea is definable as that which increases the area 
of our world which we may take into our reckoning and which 
we may know. This capacity of ideas I have dwelt upon at some 
length in a previous paper. 9 Vision is more intellectual and 
ideal than touch, for it is a distant touch. Memory and anticipa.-
tion, dependent as I believe them to be upon ideas, bring· before 
the mincl stretches of past and future time, beyond the present 
moment which alone is immediately experienced. The increase 
of distance, depth, and scope in the world known and reckoned 
with, when ideas come upon the scene, is not merely quantitative. 
At least certain types of order, of relations, of universals, and 
of meaning are known through ideas. Conversely ( and this is 
the second considerafaon) the more immediate experience is and 
the less it has of ideas, tbe more partial and selective it is. I per-
ceive only what my own type .o•f sense organ and nervous system 
and my own practical interests determine shall be selected out 
from the total infinite wealth of my environment. Experience is 
primarily practical; what I perceive is an enormously compacted 
9 "The Nature and Habitat of Mind," in Issues and Tendencies in 
Contemporary Philosophy (Univ. Calif. Publ. Philos., IV, 1923), pp. 47-73. 
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and simplified symbol of objects needful for me to discriminate 
and to take into my practical reckoning. That our perceptions 
of secondary qualities have chiefly a practical and biological 
significance was clearly stated by Descartes in the sixth medita-
tion. The practical utility of perception, which presumably justi-
fied its origin and further development, necessitates its partial 
and selective character. To perceive anything is to fasten an 
exclusive attention upon it and to be inattentive to the infinite 
range of things which are real and which are theoretically know-
able, but whose perception is not relevant to the immediate 
practical situation. 
But this discernment of the selective and partial nature of 
perception broadens out into the recognition of a profound· anti-
nomy between all experience in so far as it is practical and reason 
as theoretic and contemplative. If I set out to know my world, 
I must 1nclude in my _knowledge or theory every fact which is 
discoverable. All facts, merely as facts, are of equ~ value. My 
theoretic insight must comprehend and 'save' all o-f the appear-
ances. Catholicity and inclusiveness are the marks of such, 
theoretic interest. This is but the necessary implication of that 
prime function of reason and ideas, to widen and to deepen the 
range of the mind's vision. On the other hand, a selection ;md 
choice, an exclusive preference for this as against that, a loyalty 
to one cause to the exclusion of all other competing causes, of 
such is our practical life. To know is always to· be impartial with 
respect to everything which falls within the world to be known, 
and in the end that world has no boundaries. To act is always to 
be partial to some one object of exclusive interest, attention and 
loyalty. The very concept of 'practical :reason' seems thus to be a 
misnomer, since practice means selective partiality while reason 
connotes impartial comprehensiveness and totality. Such nar-
rowing down of what we might theoretically apprehend, to a 
highly restricted and partial object of our interest and choice 
thus appears to characterize all practical experience along the 
entire line of development from perception to deliberative will. 
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For my will acts are the rejection of all possible and theoretical 
alternatives save the one decided upon. Reason may contemplate 
a wide theater of simultaneous possibilities-it is the business of 
reason and ideas to comprehend broad ancl deep vistas--my 
practical choice seizes upon one possibility and annihilates the 
rest. 
Ancl so this relation between reason and experience is precisely 
the opposite of that implied by our :first interpretation. There 
the rational was the certain, either as the immediate or as the 
simple and self-identical, and experience overflowed far beyond 
any such area of certainty. Now, experience is the practical, the 
immediate, the thing here and now to be attended to, while reason 
and ideas bring before the mind vistas and perspectives far wider 
and more inclusive. Experience is partial and narrow; reason 
is impartial, objective, and total. 
But there is a. further manner in which this tension between 
reason and experience may be po-rtrayecl and interpreted, and a 
hasty mention of this will send us at once to still a third inte_rpre-
tation of what reason is and does. The data of experience as they 
come to our minds unsought not only undergo a process of selec-
tion, we not only narrow clown through attention and practical 
interests the far wider area which is there for our theoretical 
ideas to apprehend, but our experience both theoretical and prac-
tical is also a process of building up, through construction ancl 
interpretation, structures which shall possess significance for us. 
I know not ho,v else civilization may be clescribecl except as the 
totality of structures which man's spirit has built up because they 
provide a habitat more fitted to the energies of his spirit than are 
just the data which he merely finds. Science itself is an expres-
sion of the mind's activity as it seeks to transform the raw mate-
rial of experience into something more intelligible and more signi-
ficant. To assert this is certainly not to say that any mind has 
contrived the objects of our scientific apprehension. But these 
objects would never be discovered were not our minds ceaselessly 
striving to discover meaning, order, and continuity which are not 
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found in the same manner as are the dab of experience thrust 
upon us willy nilly. Science is the never ending activity which 
seeks to render the data of our experience theoretically intelli-
gible and significant; it is itself the child of civilization which is 
but man's enterprise of fashioning some fit home for the needs 
and the life of the hum.an spirit. The Greek city state, surrounded 
by the barbarian world, represents such a partial but permanently 
significant conquest of reason, building up and domesticating for 
the mind a domain of rationality. The structures thus provided 
are rational not because they possess im.m.edia.cy or mere sim-
plicity, and not only because they expand and fill out the meager-
ness of our immediate personal experience into something more 
total and inclus.ive, but chiefly because they are in some fashion 
adapted to the deeper requirements of the hum.an spirit. I find 
more than a hint of this interpretation of reason in a paragraph 
of Coleridge's Table TaZk which I s.hall read: 
I am by the law of my nature a reasoneL A person who should suppose 
that I meant by that word, arguer, would not only not unders~and me, but 
would unclerstancl the contrary of my meaning. I can take no interest 
whatever in hearing or saying anything merely as a fact-merely as hav-
ing happened. It must refer to something within me before I can regard 
it with any curiosity or care. My mind is always energic-I don't mean 
energetic; I rnquiTe in everything what, for lack of another word, I may 
call propriety.10 
This thesis as to the meaning of reason, that it stands for that 
active process of interpreting and organizing, of building out and 
filling in all data of experience so that our meanings and our 
nature are por.trayed in the structures which we acknowledge as 
significant and as real, this thesis is one rendering of the Kantian 
analysis of experience. It is a reading of Kant's Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories upon which Royce constantly wished 
to lay stress. The first definite statement by Royce of this as 
the outcome of Km1t 's teachings was set forth in substance in a 
paper upon ''Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress,'' 
read at the Kant Centennial ( the Centennial of the publication 
1° Coleridge, Table Tallc, March 1, 1834, Bohn ed., p. 275. 
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of the Criti;qiie) in 1881.11 It is held to be the central thread in 
the development of Post-Kantian Idealism in Royce's posthumous 
Lectitres 011, Modern Idealism. 
The world of our experience (I quote his summary in his own words) 
becomes a rational realm to us in so far as we can interpret it in terms of 
ideas that adequately express our own conscious purposes. . . . . The 
world is, at least in appearance, irrational in so far as it refuses at any 
moment to express our meaning, to embody the categories of our thought, 
to realize the ideals of our conduct, to pe1·mit the unity of consciousness 
to come into synthesis with the brute facts of sense and of emotion.12 
That experience is not only a finding, a sheer recognition of 
the given, but also an active process of selection, of interpretation, 
and of construction, and these latter in a sense more profund than 
psychology brings fa our notice, I can have no doubt. But once 
we recognize this double aspect of experience, we are confronted 
with a tension and cleavage more disquieting and more pervasive 
than that which we noted above to sever the life of knowledge 
from the life of our practical interests. To reflect upon this new 
and deeper antinomy is to be brought back again to the question 
of the relation not only between reason and experience, but 
between experience and reality. For, in so far as the mind does 
anything whatever to the bare data which it might merely find, 
the structures thus modified acquire indeed a significance and 
rationality which alien and mere data do not possess. But they 
seemingly acquire this meaning at the expense of their reality, 
their objectivity and their independence. The data of experience 
would seem to belong to the real; they are the gifts and offerings 
of nature. They came to us from beyond ourselves, and if we 
could catch them and hold them fast just as they begin to hover 
within our own possession, they might tell us of the realm from 
which they have come. In contemplating them before they 
become tarnished by exposure to the processes of our own nature, 
we would be nearest to the knowledge of reality. But we are not 
content merely to accept these gifts, we seize upon them only to 
interpret them, to use them, to organize them, to build upon them 
11 Published in The Jmirnal of Speculative Philosophy, XY. 
12 J. Royce, Lect1ires on Modern Idealism, pp. 245, 247. 
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such rational structures as shall embody our meanings and pur-
poses. It would appear to follow from this situation, so hastily 
sketched, that the world which is real because it is the source of 
the given is not the world which has significance and value for 
us, and the world which we acknowledge as rational is not the 
real world. I should myself hold that something like this is the 
deeper and final meaning of Hume's skepticism. 
alone yield knowledge of the real, or are the real. 
Impressions 
We adcl to 
impressions through custom ancl imagination, we impute connec-
tions,. order and stability, causality and substance, into impres-
sions thereby spoiling their worth as transcripts of reality, but 
making them humanly significant. We can live only in a world 
thus organized and domesticated, but the world thus build up is 
artificial and not real. 
I have elsewhere used the term '' significant structure'' to 
designate a structure which is both objective and real, and also 
rational and charged with meaning because it is, in some fashion, 
linked with our own intentions, attitudes, and interests. Signi-
ficant structures in some sense indeed exist, which are the objects 
of our theoretical insight and also of our practical loyal.ties and 
affections.. Our ideas and our purposes terminate in such struc-
tures. But are these significant structures owned by reality? Or, 
are they patterns woven merely from the .terms of our human dis-
course, inhabiting at best the shadowy realm of essence, hovering 
midway between our minds and the recondite life of nature which 
they .caricature rather than disclose?18 To know what really 
exists is indeed possible, if at all, only through observing in detail 
what it is that our world gives us. Reality is that which ,.ve find, 
and not those merely human ancl artificial structures which come 
into existence only as they are contrived by our minds and our 
human discourse. But reality does not exhaust itself in her first 
gifts and messages, in bare impressions and perceptions, nor m 
any immediate experience. Science would be something trivial 
1s Cf. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith, p. 10·4: "The ideas of 
things are not fair portraits; they are political caricatm:es inade in the 
1:tuman interest.'' 
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were all the achievements of human reflection and interpretation 
but fabrications of human discourse, adventitiously added to the 
first crude and fragmentary data, which nature offers us, and 
which we receive more for their practical utility than their cogni 0 
tive value. These never ending· active processes of interpretation, 
the framing of these intelligible structures which we name 
science, which call for so much inventiveness, imagination, and 
the genuinely constructive activities of our reason, may also be 
discoveries ancl disclosures of the na.ture of things. For, I do 
not krn;iw how, in the end, I am to distinguish between invention 
and discovery, between the artificial and the natural. Science is 
both a creation of the human spirit and a. revelation of the nature 
and life of things. Nor do I see how, in principle, I am to draw 
any decisive line between the theoretical interests which find 
. expression in science and philosophy, and those other interests 
which we like to distinguish as practical and non-theoretical; as 
if science were nothing but a finding, and all else in civilization 
nothing but a making. Of all these significant activities of the 
human spirit, I should say that they too, like science, may be 
disclosures of the nature of things, not the easy ancl obvious dis-
coveries of prima facie data, but of what reality jg, and is capable 
of yielding to us in the deeper reaches of our experience. For, 
once more, I do not know how, in principle, I am to sever the 
theoretical and the practical. Bradley seems to me quite right 
in saying that "between that which is practical and that which 
is not practical we thus seem in the end unable to maintain any 
difference.14 
But I have no desire to leave behind any impression that this 
third manner of envisaging the relation between reason and 
experience setg, us at once upon the high road which leads to an 
adequate metaphysics. I think :i:nyself that it is a roacl worth 
following as far as it may lead. But every road will be tortuous, 
and each fresh turning will disclose both unforeseen barriers and, 
it may be, unexpected vistas. 
14 Ibid., p. 103. 
